

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**THE NATIONAL GUARD MEETING ITS OBLIGATION  
TO PROVIDE CAPABLE FORCES FOR HOMELAND SECURITY**

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## **ABSTRACT**

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How can competing National Guard missions (federal and state) and structure requirements (warfighting verses domestic support/homeland security) be harmonized to best posture the Guard to meet both its state obligations and at the same time continue to play a pivotal role in joint warfighting and stability operations? The increased reliance on the National Guard as a combat force, regional peacekeeping force and a homeland defense/security force has stressed the National Guard beyond programmed requirements. As a result of the conflicting mission TTP's (Tactics, Techniques and Procedures) required to execute the warfighting verses domestic support/homeland security missions the National Guard's training time and funding resources are inadequate under the current OPTEMPO in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Should the National Guard be organized and trained for urban security missions such as Counter Insurgency Operations (COIN), policing, law enforcement and civil population control and thus become a lighter (infantry, military police, transportation, etc.) force. A lighter force that is rapidly deployable, highly mobile, and versatile benefits from reduced equipment and maintenance funding requirements. National Guard structure must be changed from a "Strength/Legacy Based" structure to a "Capabilities Based" structure in order to maintain relevancy over the next two decades.



## THE NATIONAL GUARD MEETING ITS OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE CAPABLE FORCES FOR HOMELAND SECURITY

In the aftermath of 9/11 and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, commentators have offered wide ranging views on the unique circumstances that the United States military finds itself confronting. Recognition of a growing dependence on the Army's reserve component has caused many to reevaluate their long standing positions on the fundamental roles, missions, and structure of reserve component units. An increased awareness of the nation's reliance (or perhaps over reliance) on the National Guard in particular has forced many to call for fundamental changes in the Guard's roles and responsibilities.<sup>1</sup>

United States Defense posture and structure in general have changed significantly since the end of the Cold War. However, changes in the Army National Guard have occurred more slowly and less dramatically. Increasing the character and scope of change in the National Guard are essential steps toward making it more capable of meeting its diverse mission responsibilities. These range from warfighting and support to civil authorities to homeland defense.

The Department of Defense should identify those core competencies required for the National Guard's federal mission, its support to civil authorities or domestic support mission, and its homeland security mission and identify complementary aspects of those missions. Current training requirements will not develop the required individual and collective competencies to support the Guard's homeland security mission, for example. Often Guard combat arms units train on their conventional warfighting competencies year round and to very high standards, only to be most commonly employed in homeland security or support to civil authorities. These are missions that they are, by default, less prepared to undertake.

The flaw in the Army readiness philosophy with regard to the National Guard is that units are trained to very high standards in their conventional warfighting mission while that mission is perhaps increasingly less relevant and Guard forces are most commonly employed as law enforcement, security, or transportation and logistic assets in a homeland security and support to civilian authorities capacity. Training standards for the National Guard's homeland defense mission at national level for example need to be identified and resourced in order to better enable Guard forces to develop the security, civil disorder, law enforcement, consequence management, and disaster relief and assistance competencies necessary to most effective employment.

Reserve Component mobilizations have given a transforming Army the opportunity to correct an existing Army National Guard force structure imbalance. This imbalance is more

fundamental than end strength or organization alone and reflects the increasing tension between the Guard's missions and responsibilities and a force structure that is proving increasingly inadequate to meeting and fulfilling its assigned functions. To remain relevant, ready, and capable of meeting its obligations the National Guard must transform to a modular, adaptable, multi-purpose organization that is employable against a variety of internal and external challenges.

To date, the National Guard has exceeded many expectations with regard to readiness and unit performance on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan. However, there are indications that this will not last indefinitely, nor does it reflect a general capacity to perform all assigned missions. A mission and force structure imbalance combined with the post 9/11 OPEMPO have placed unique stresses on the National Guard as it manages competing demands at home and abroad. This may be reflected in recent Guard recruiting and retention shortfalls. Some have argued that the Guard's full partnership in the prosecution of the GWOT and its current force structure/mission imbalances have brought the Guard close to the breaking point.<sup>2</sup> For example, the Army National Guard missed its 2005 fiscal year recruiting goal by 5,000 enlistments while combat and combat arms units must undergo intensive retraining upon mobilization to fill active-duty shortfalls. Equally troubling is that this retraining is sometimes conducted by inexperienced trainers, in the absence of regular training units that have been recently deployed for other missions.<sup>3</sup>

Unit cohesion and morale too may be at risk.<sup>4</sup> These are the lifeblood of any Army organization and are a constant concern for Guard leaders. If these problems remain unaddressed the National Guard may discover it will have serious problems with the voluntary retention of experienced soldiers at the very time the need is greatest. Evidence of this is already manifesting itself in the Army Research Institute surveys that project only 27 percent of Guard and Reserve soldiers have the intention to re-enlist - an all-time low.<sup>5</sup>

The key question seems to be: how can the National Guard effectively manage its current missions (federal and state), structure, and training requirements (warfighting verses domestic support/homeland security) to best meet both its state and national obligations? One key solution is to capitalize on complimentary aspects of the state and federal missions, harmonizing the National Guard's capabilities with its broad responsibilities. This would allow the Guard to optimize its organizations to effectively confront those common aspects of both the internal and external security environments that it will likely be called on to contend with in the future (irregular and catastrophic challenges<sup>6</sup>). The complementary mission sets that can best optimize Guard capability for the state and federal missions are: security and civil disorder, law

enforcement, consequence management and disaster relief and assistance. These mission sets provide the United States with National Guard forces that can be employed in a variety of ways at home and abroad.

In order to establish a point of departure for discussion on the mission, force structure, and training needs of the National Guard that would enable greater optimization, it is important to first establish some key assumptions. Future roles and missions for the Guard must be based on a set of assumptions that are likely to remain valid well into the future. The first of these is that the National Guard will continue to maintain its fundamental reason for existence. This is found in the U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8. Here the Constitution authorizes the militia "to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasion."<sup>7</sup>

Second, the National Guard will continue to be the link between the U.S. Army and main street America. This historical link bonds the active Army to the National Guard and therefore, to the local communities that they both serve. This linkage is critical and must not be marginalized. The Guard for years has served as the "Army's face" with its 3,222 local armories in 2,700 American communities.<sup>8</sup> This constant connection between the America population and its Army is a key strength in a fighting force that is often envied by much of the world.

Third, current Guard posture with its wide national distribution will continue to provide a key advantage to both the President and state governors for responding effectively to domestic emergencies. The Guard provides a ready force that is widely distributed throughout the U.S. This national distribution allows the Guard to respond quickly anywhere within the U.S. on very short notice. Just as the U.S. relies on pre-positioning overseas to shorten response time internationally, pre-positioned National Guard equipment, personnel and facilities in local communities enable the quick reaction of Guard forces in response to a domestic emergency. This forward-deployed approach to the distribution of units, equipment, and resources from a domestic perspective ensures that the Guard is positioned to best support the vital defense of the homeland.

Finally, the Guard will continue to be a cost effective way to maintain a trained, equipped, and ready force without the burden of maintaining substantially larger active duty forces. The Guard's performance since 2001 has demonstrated its utility in this role and therefore, its critical importance to national efforts in the War on Terror.

In spite of the demonstrated utility and adaptability of reserve forces in their employment in the War on Terror, it is clear the Guard is not optimized for broadest employment or an increased role in Homeland Defense and Security. There is an obvious dilemma that pits the Guard's historic partnership with the active component for conventional warfighting abroad with

increased responsibility in Homeland Defense and common employment for domestic emergencies. This dilemma is a product of history and very deliberate actions taken during the mid-1970s in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. General Creighton W. Abrams, Jr. proposed a novel approach to reconstituting the US Army after Vietnam. This has since become known as the "Abrams' Doctrine."<sup>9</sup> After Vietnam, Abrams, then Army Chief of Staff, pledged that the Army would never again go to war without fully engaging the American people and gaining their full support for the war effort. Much like his predecessor George C. Marshall<sup>10</sup>, Abrams recognized the National Guard as a valuable link between the American people and a sound national security strategy. He deliberately developed the "round out" concept that established strong links between National Guard units and like active component units.<sup>11</sup> This both facilitated stronger relationships between the active and reserve components and offered the Guard greater training opportunities. He advocated these adjustments to ensure a solid link between the Army, through the National Guard, and the American People at large.<sup>12</sup>

In 1973, as a result of declining federal defense budgets and the recent U.S. experience in Vietnam, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger enacted the "Total Force Policy" (TFP), implicitly validating Abram's concept and affirming it as national policy for the entire U.S. defense establishment. TFP stated that, "Active, National Guard, and Reserve forces will share in world-wide missions, resource allocation, and force structure. All forces will be equipped and trained to the same rigorous standards."<sup>13</sup> Today, the Total Force Policy remains in force. The Total Force itself is comprised of Active and Reserve component forces, Department of Defense Civilians, and civilian contractors.

The "Total Force Policy" remains as valid today as when it was enacted in 1973. Thus, by necessity, the Army Reserve and National Guard have been equal partners with the active Army in the prosecution of the War on Terror. The National Guard in particular has provided forces in support of homeland security and the Global War on Terror (GWOT) from the very morning of September 11, 2001. On that day, soldiers from the Rainbow Division (42<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division (Mechanized)) formed Task Force Liberty and responded to the World Trade Center attack site. Task Force Liberty consisted of approximately 3,000 soldiers, drawn from the Army National Guard, the Naval Militia, and the Air National Guard. Since that day and as of February 2006, more than 244,135 soldiers have been mobilized under Title 10 authority while a combined total of 333,233 have served in both a Title 10 and 32 status in support of GWOT.<sup>14</sup> This level of Reserve Component commitment exemplifies Abrams' vision and has indeed connected the American people directly to the most urgent national security issue of the day. The aggressive



deployment and employment of the National Guard in support of the GWOT has brought the war home to average Americans.

Though we must acknowledge the positive aspects of Abrams' total force vision, there is very little light at the end of the tunnel with respect to resolving the existing imbalance between Guard missions, training, and force structure and harmonizing all to better support the Guard's various missions and responsibilities. High OPTEMPO, long deployments, and an increasingly short dwell time between deployments has compounded the Guard's challenge and placed a great deal of stress on the National Guard as an institution.

The Army has tried to relieve some of this stress by employing a unit rotational policy, known as the Army Forces Generation Model, or "ARFORGEN."<sup>15</sup> Developed by the current Army Chief of Staff, General Peter Schoomaker, ARFORGEN is billed as a way for the Army to create the stability necessary to support a long-term Army commitment to the War on Terror. Army leaders assert that ARFORGEN allows them to better manage unit readiness and availability by prioritizing resources and training venues. While ARFORGEN is postured to ease the demands imposed by tempo, little has been done with regard to the issues of mission and structure imbalances.

### **Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN)**




Figure 1. Army Force Generation Model

This research project is not meant to provide an exact prescription for a National Guard redesign that will completely ease this imbalance. It will however, provide a general outline of

the means required to better rationalize complimentary internal and external missions with force structure and training. The competing mission requirements in the post 9/11 world necessitate a change in how the National Guard should be employed as a part of the Total Force.

It is unrealistic to assume that the Guard can fulfill the increasing range of missions it is currently assigned without some modification in the missions and training that support them. All should leverage the complimentary aspects of the internal and external environment and its demands. The Guard simply does not have the resources required for every mission, task, or requirement. It is therefore, important to clearly identify and articulate the priority mission responsibilities of the National Guard that are most broadly applicable to foreign and domestic employment and develop sustainable force structure, training, and resourcing that support them.

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) calls for changes in Reserve Component forces that make units and individuals more accessible and more readily deployable. If done effectively, these changes will help harmonize the National Guard's competing, but still complimentary, missions. According to the QDR, the DoD has decided to:<sup>16</sup>

- Pursue authority for increased access to the Reserve Component: to increase the period authorized for Presidential Reserve Call-up for 270 to 365 days
- Better focus for the use of Reserve Components' competencies for homeland defense and civil support operations, and seek changes to authorities to improve access to the Guard and reserve consequence management capabilities and capacity in support of civil authorities.
- Achieve revision of Presidential Reserve Call-up authorities to allow activation.....for natural disasters in order to smooth the process....without relying solely on volunteers.
- Allow individuals who volunteer for activation on short notice to serve for long periods on major headquarters staffs as individual augmentees.
- Develop select reserve units that train more intensively and require shorter notice for deployment.

The QDR also calls for the Total Force to be increasingly proficient against irregular challenges. This means an increased focus in areas like counterinsurgency, counter-terrorism, and stabilization operations. The Army will accomplish this through development of modular unit structures at all levels. These will be self-sustaining units that are capable of performing in traditional formations as well as capable of deploying as smaller, more autonomous elements.<sup>17</sup> The National Guard can be better postured to assume the roles described in the QDR in its

federal, state, and homeland security mission with an adjusted set of clearly defined roles and missions and some changes in structure.

However, before discussing this in any great detail, it is important to define the different missions that the National Guard is currently obligated to meet. The federal mission is “to maintain properly trained and equipped units, available for prompt mobilization for war, national emergency or as otherwise needed.”

As Army Chief of Staff, General Peter Schoomaker stated in his vision, “as part of the process in the past the reserve component units and personnel would “Alert, Mobilize, Train and Deploy.” Today, we will “Train, Alert and Deploy.”<sup>18</sup> This comment ultimately challenges the status quo with regard to training the National Guard and recognizes how critical the National Guard is to the Total Force. It is important to note however, that this does not limit the responsibility of the National Guard to warfighting alone. The National Guard's role within an Area of Operation (AO) that is under the control of a Combatant Commander (COCOM) could include Stability and Support, Peacekeeping, Humanitarian Support, and Major Combat Operations (MCO). Since September 11, 2001 the National Guard has provided 26,181 soldiers to COCOMs in contingencies other than combat operations world-wide.<sup>19</sup> It is thus important not to lose sight of the importance of National Guard forces for the widest variety of operational missions overseas.

The challenge for the Guard is to balance the needs of the President and his COCOMs for combat forces (federal mission capability) against the need for forces capable of meeting the needs of state and federal domestic emergency and homeland security missions (combined mission capability). This requires developing a force structure that meets the COCOM's combat requirements while still being able to meet the requirements of a state Governor or the President for domestic challenges that require a significant employment of Guard forces. Optimizing the capabilities of the National Guard for complementary mission sets and building forces that are compatible with both the state and federal demands is the most direct route to this end. As stated earlier, complementary subordinate missions in the Guard's internal and external security missions include: security and civil disorder, law enforcement, consequence management, and disaster relief and assistance.

To better gain a sense of the conflicting mission requirements and force structure imbalances they create, it is important to define key aspects of the state and federal missions. The mission of the National Guard when under Title 32 of the U.S. Code is “to provide trained and disciplined forces for domestic emergencies or as otherwise directed by state laws.”<sup>20</sup> Title 32 governs Guard employment by state governors. This is a broad mission statement that

charters tasks, conditions, standards, a required knowledge and experience base, and unique skills and abilities that appear different from those required by the COCOM for combat operations. However, deeper consideration implies that there are distinct similarities between some federal and state mission requirements that can be harmonized to better optimize the National Guard's structure and capabilities.

The National Guard must provide trained and ready forces for the protection of life and property within a state in the event of an emergency situation by supporting first responders and Emergency Managers at the local, state, and regional level. Emergencies such as wild fires, blizzards, floods, hurricanes, ice storms and riots also fall under the National Guard's domestic emergency role. For example, emergencies of the scope of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 tasked National Guard structure nation-wide.<sup>21</sup> As of 1 January 2006, there were 2,900 Guardsmen and women serving in Title 32 and State Active Duty status supporting state Governors performing a variety of missions ranging from counter-narcotics, protection of critical infrastructure, airport and border security, and general homeland defense.<sup>22</sup> These are just a handful of examples of the type of missions that involve individual and collective skills that can be harmonized to fulfill a federal, state, and combined mission need and best optimize the National Guard's broad utility.

The restructuring of the National Guard to date has focused on one component of its federal mission (high intensity warfighting). Limited consideration has been given to the state Governor's responsibility to provide for the internal security of a state in an emergency as well as the homeland defense mission more broadly. It is a mistake to assume that the force structure and equipment required for the federal mission would be just as effective for a domestic support or homeland defense mission.

To better define the future structure and training needs of the National Guard it is essential to identify those roles and missions which are complementary. Identifying the roles and missions which have compatible tasks will help determine those forces with like or complimentary capabilities. The identification of future roles, missions, and training requirements aids in developing multi-purpose units, broadly employable against a range of foreign and domestic challenges in support of the federal and state mission. The similarities between missions are where efficiencies and savings can be experienced and exploited. To graphically depict the potential roles and missions for the National Guard in supporting the Total Force, a simple comparison of missions and capabilities is presented below which shows potential areas for harmonizing resources and missions.

<b>Security and Civil Disorder</b>		
State	Federal	Homeland Security
Civil Disturbance Operations	Security Operations	Compatible
<b>Law Enforcement</b>		
State	Federal	Homeland Security
Law Enforcement	Stability and Support Operations	Compatible
<b>Consequence Management</b>		
State	Federal	Homeland Security
Domestic Emergency Support	Support to Civil Authorities	Compatible
<b>Disaster Relief and Assistance</b>		
State	Federal	Homeland Security
Disaster / Homeland Support Assistance (Natural / Terror Attack)	Humanitarian and Disaster Relief	Compatible

TABLE 1.

Among the three mission sets outlined homeland defense is an evolving mission that remains ill-defined for the U.S. military in general, but the National Guard more specifically. Virtually everyone with an opinion on the subject of homeland defense has an idea for solving obvious definitional inconsistencies and capabilities shortfalls. These include a number of attempts to define the National Guard's role in defending the homeland. Commander Jay Smith, a 2002 graduate of the National Security Fellowship at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, has offered the best description of those homeland security tasks which the National Guard would become involved.<sup>23</sup>

- Deterring an attack on U.S. homeland through the credible threat of massive retribution on the political attackers;
- Conducting preemptive or reactive strikes on known terrorist forces beyond U.S. borders;
- Protecting borders and key sites within the homeland such as dams, bridges, airports, and nuclear power plants;
- Providing quick assistance to initial response agencies following an attack on the homeland by conventional, chemical, biological, or nuclear means; and
- Managing the long-term consequences of an attack - for example, overseeing orderly evacuations; providing for crowd control; and assisting with medical treatment and law enforcement activities.

All of the potential military activities outlined by Commander Smith are major areas where the National Guard has or will likely develop shared responsibilities with the active component. Of these, those that require protection of borders and key infrastructure, quick response capability, and consequence management after an attack will likely be the major mission areas established for the National Guard in the area of homeland defense.<sup>24</sup> Most notable about these again is their complementary nature with other state and national demands. For example, the protection of key infrastructure (dams, bridges and airports) under emergency circumstances in a state require most of the same competencies required to perform a similar mission in a COCOM area of operation in support of major combat or stability operations.

In April 2002, Jack Spencer and Larry Wortzel, in a Heritage Foundation "Backgrounder", advanced the idea that the National Guard should become the lead military agency in homeland security. The article states "The National Guard is the logical element of the U.S. armed forces to act as the lead military agency for homeland security."<sup>25</sup> Their thesis is that "the close relationship between the National Guard and their locales must be leveraged to ensure that local Guard units are prepared to respond to attacks and help train first responders."<sup>26</sup>

The Chief of the National Guard Bureau, Lieutenant General Blum seems to agree. He recently stated in the 2006 National Guard Posture Statement, "Mission one for the National Guard is Homeland Defense. The President, Governors, Congress and the Secretary of Defense have clearly insisted that the National Guard be fully prepared to engage in Homeland Defense and to support Homeland Security missions while simultaneously engaged in combat overseas; in fact, they insist that we be more accessible than we've ever been in the past."<sup>27</sup>

Looking more holistically at the Guard and the prospect of harmonizing state and federal missions, it is clear some adjustment in force structure is required to correct the Guard's mission to structure imbalances. The National Guard is heavy in combat forces. These forces are structured, for the most part, as medium to heavy combat formations with legacy equipment. National Guard force structure represents 34% of total Army strength. It has 54% of the Army's combat power, 70% its field artillery assets, and 32% of Army combat service support.<sup>28</sup> As of January 2006 eight of the fifteen combat brigades serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom are National Guard brigades. These structure, training, and employment realities, while continuing to rely on Guard forces for conventional warfighting responsibilities perpetuate the existing imbalance between force structure and the most common state and federal Guard missions.

Conventional warfighting remains the first of the core requirements of the Guard's federal mission. The Guard will for some time be expected to provide trained, ready, and deployable units to support of the COCOM warfighting requirements. Indeed, the range of missions that

federal authorities will ask the National Guard to perform will remain significant. Overseas these missions will include: major combat operations (MCO), humanitarian support, and stability and support operations. In a domestic role, federal missions will include: humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, emergency response, and population relocation activities.

With the exception of MCO, state and federal homeland security responsibilities will include many of the same discrete tasks required of the National Guard in the conduct of its traditional federal responsibilities. These include emergency response, disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, civilian evacuation, security operations and law enforcement. In fact, law enforcement is currently a security competency that under the current provisions of the federal "Posse Comitatus Act" is unique to the National Guard alone.<sup>29</sup>

In addition, neither Homeland Security/Defense nor responses to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) attack are new missions for the Guard. These missions are almost exclusively within the National Guard's traditional realm of action. In fact, the National Guard is uniquely positioned to assume a leadership role for the homeland defense mission, as it is currently "forward-deployed" across the United States. This local capability comes from the Guard's geographical dispersion, experience and connection with first responders, knowledge of the local communities where Guard units live and serve, an understanding of local and state capabilities, experience operating under both state and federal chains of command, and an understanding of local, state and national political support. Despite these unique qualifications, however, the National Guard's current structure detracts from its ability to effectively support the homeland defense mission. This mismatch in capability results from an overemphasis on the Guard's traditional high-intensity combat role in an era of increased irregular and catastrophic challenge that requires a more adaptable and broadly employable force.

An increased emphasis on homeland security would require the National Guard's capabilities to be adjusted to better meet the needs of the nation for the future in an irregular or catastrophic environment. There are a number of steps that the National Guard can take to improve its current posture in the area of homeland defense. The first and most important step however, cannot be exclusively left to the Guard alone. This is publication of a commonly understood homeland defense policy that clearly defines roles and missions across the interagency, within DoD, and for the National Guard in particular. This policy must define objectives, priorities, interagency responsibilities, and command arrangements.

Next the National Guard should be adequately represented on the Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) staff. The National Guard's strong link to individual states and their communities is under-represented on the NORTHCOM staff and will likely remain under-

represented without a significant National Guard presence. This is documented throughout report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina. The Executive Summary of the report states, "Northern Command does not have adequate insight into state response capabilities or adequate interface with governors, which contributed to a lack of mutual understanding and trust during the Katrina response."<sup>30</sup> The Guard presence on the USNORTHCOM staff must be more than a liaison cell or coordinating staff. In fact, a senior Guard leader with significant experience should be assigned a position of leadership like Deputy Commanding General, NORTHCOM in order to increase the Guard's prominence in the area of homeland defense/security.

The infusion of Guard leaders into the staff and command team will significantly improve the communication with Guard units in the field. Command arrangements within NORTHCOM also must be clarified to minimize the confusion in the field when Active, Reserve, and Guard elements operate jointly in a National Special Security Event (NSSE) or homeland defense role. The current Title 10/32 leadership procedures for NSSE are a good first step in clarifying the chain of command; these authorities should become permanent in order to become institutionalized in both the active and reserve forces.

In order to harmonize the National Guard's missions (federal and state), capabilities and structure requirements must be matched with unit capabilities, geography, and utility as well. Units with a structure and mission that facilitates the accomplishment of the federal/state compatible mission should have priority for the National Guard. Military police, civil support, medical support, engineering, logistics, quartermaster, communications, aviation, transportation and other combat service support units are examples of the types of units should be considered as possessing this multi-purpose, mission compatibility. In addition, units such as light infantry and special operations forces that can quickly adapt their capabilities and organizations to meet foreign or domestic needs in law enforcement and security operations should also receive some priority for assignment into the National Guard. These formations bring complimentary capabilities that are employable in the combat operations arena, support of civil authorities at home, and support of a Governor's domestic support and homeland defense mission requirements.

The political realities of such significant refocusing, missioning, and rebalancing will generate some resistance from state governors, legislatures, and congressional delegations immediately. Individually state leaders and state congressional delegations would look at any move to change the National Guard structure and manning authorizations with great apprehension and suspicion. On March 1, 2006 for example, Senator Ben Nelson, D-Neb, said,



“There is no question that the National Guard is an integral component of our domestic and international security. But the recently announced Guard cuts in the Federal Budget and Quadrennial Defense Review raise plenty of questions.”<sup>31</sup> In order to generate support for change, Governors must be shown the value added to the National Guard in terms of capability, utility, and mission compatibility. At the same time, national military leaders must be confident that Guard capabilities are also broadly employable for a range of contingencies abroad.

In addition, both federal and state leaders need to be shown how harmonization will improve overall quality of the force and its local, regional, and federal employability. It is unrealistic to expect that there is sufficient force structure available to provide each state the capacity to meet their individual homeland defense responsibilities, for example. Each state Governor, Adjutant General, and Emergency Management Director should evaluate individual state assets to develop an estimate of state capabilities (military, law enforcement, public safety, emergency services, etc.). This analysis will provide a validated starting point for individual state homeland defense needs to be determined and resourced and regional gaps or shortfalls to be identified.

The previous methodology in assigning National Guard units to states and regions in the U.S. has been focused on the state's ability to maintain strength, provide adequate training facilities, and gubernatorial and Congressional interest. If a unit failed to maintain its strength maintenance goals structure would be moved to another state. This encouraged state National Guard leadership to give recruiting priority to those units that has dual mission capability. In the extreme, it places the unit combat capability responsibilities of the National Guard in poor readiness condition and has potentially led to longer mobilization times. Consideration and distribution of force structure should provide the capability required by states to meet the homeland security mission while distributing the federal mission capabilities nationally so the Guard is best postured to meet foreign and domestic federal missions.

The Guard continues to develop skills and deployment capabilities to bridge the current force structure and mission imbalance and enhance its relevance. Each of the following homeland security initiatives are being adopted to increase the responsiveness and capability of the National Guard in meeting its joint obligation for the defense of the homeland, for example. The National Guard has undertaken four basic new roles that are equally compatible with the federal, state, and homeland security missions. These include (1) Critical Infrastructure Protection, (2) Chemical, Biological, Radiological/Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Response, (3) Prompt Coordinated Federal Response, and (4) Homeland Defense Training.<sup>32</sup> These roles can easily be fulfilled by units and organizations that are modular in structure and

compatible in mission. Though focused first at addressing gaps in homeland security and support to civil authorities, most, if not all, are compatible to critical functions in foreign contingencies as well.

For Critical Infrastructure Protection each state mans a Joint Forces Headquarters, Joint Operations Center (JFHQ-JOC). This network of JOCs links the National Guard Bureau, each state, territory, and the District of Columbia in an effective command and control structure. The primary purpose of the JFHQ-JOCs is to coordinate, facilitate, and synchronize efforts in support of individual states in the event of a crisis. Each JOC has a redundant communications and information infrastructure that is linked to DoD. The JOC provides the state the ability to effectively command and control forces employed protecting infrastructure, responding to a consequence management event, or coordinating with first responders. In support of the warfight, these operation centers are easily deployable and can transition to an Emergency Operation Center (EOC) or quick response cell employable in non-traditional roles.<sup>33</sup>

The National Guard Reaction Forces (NGRF) consists of battalion size elements that can respond to an emergency on short notice. The tasking is to provide 75 – 125 soldiers within 4 to 8 hours and up to an additional 375 soldiers in 24 to 36 hours. The NGRF mission is to provide Critical Infrastructure Protection, site security, and security and support during Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Effect (CBRNE) contingencies. This force can be deployed in a traditional or non-traditional environment, world-wide or domestically on very short notice.<sup>34</sup>

Currently there are twelve National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package (NG CERFP) structures fielded. Each NG CERFP is designed to rapidly (<96 hours) be capable of locating and extracting victims of a CBRNE incident and perform mass patient/casualty decontamination and medical triage and stabilization. The incident training provided and equipment is interoperable with that of first responders and the incident command system. The NG CERFP structure is manned by members of a state National Guard as an additional duty and not a primary mission. As an enabling force the NG CERFP can be employed by the COCOM in humanitarian or disaster relief operations thus, providing depth in the COCOM's capabilities.<sup>35</sup>

Weapons of Mass Destruction – Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST) consist of 22 Army and Air National Guard members in and Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) (Title 32) status. The mission of this unit is to deploy to and enter contaminated areas and identify contaminants within a short period of time. The unit has significant reach back communications capability to facilitate off-site evaluation and support from various laboratories. The communications systems also provide a robust capability to communicate with first responders, state officials, military

headquarters and federal agencies. As an additional capability the WMD-CST can be employed by the COCOM against irregular or catastrophic challenges in contingency operations abroad enhancing the COCOM's capability.<sup>36</sup>

Aviation Security and Support (S&S) Battalions provide a homeland security and civil support capability in Army aviation that was previously lacking. This capability provides a rapidly deployable and versatile force that incorporates the existing Reconnaissance and Interdiction Detachments (RAID) currently under the Army National Guard Counter Drug Program.<sup>37</sup>

The need for the National Guard to change its existing ideas of force structure allocation and distribution from what was traditionally a "recruiting-strength" model to a "modular-compatibility" model that significantly enhances multi-purpose mission capability is best summed up in this quote by LTG H. Steven Blum, Chief, National Guard Bureau.

Defense of our homeland is our nation's number one priority. The GWOT necessitates a range of policies, organizations, and force changes to address challenges to our homeland, specifically irregular, catastrophic and asymmetric challenges. The National Guard has primary and supporting roles in addressing our homeland security challenges from heartland U.S.A. to foreign shores. Mutually supporting capabilities in one environment must extend to be compatible in the other – this is the requirement for a full spectrum force. For 369 years, defense of our homeland, both here and abroad, has been the National Guard's focus – and as the nation's militia force, that focus should never change.

In the final analysis, the National Guard must be capable of meeting its federal and state mission; it must balance its expeditionary warfighting capability with its state and federal domestic emergency and homeland security requirements through development of a mission, structure, and training regime that ensures it is broadly employable in complimentary roles under all circumstances. This requires a balanced force that is capable of meeting the Combatant Commanders wartime needs, the state's domestic and emergency support needs, and the nation's homeland security needs. This can be done by developing a plan which distributes the National Guard's force structure across the nation to states in a way that facilitates the ability to build enhanced modular and compatible capability. The homeland security mission and its importance to America have changed how we think about the National Guard's structure, missions, capability, and compatibility in a potentially irregular and catastrophic environment. It is no longer just about the conventional warfight, it is now about providing an adaptable, agile, relevant, ready, and capable force for America no matter what the mission and or where it arises.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Jack Spencer and Larry M Wortzel, "Backgrounder," (Washington, D.C. The Heritage Foundation), April 2002, Volume No. 1532, 1

<sup>2</sup> Jaffe, "As Ranks Dwindle in a Reserve Unit, Army's Woes Mount," *Wall Street Journal*, Aug. 4, 2004, p. 1; James Kitfield, "Guard and Reserve in a Time of War," *Air Force Magazine*, July 2004, pp. 22-28.

<sup>3</sup> David Elgin, "Endangering the National Guard," 5 October 2004, available from <http://www.alternet.org/waroniraq/20083/>, Internet; accessed 7 March 2006.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Quadrennial Defense Review Report, (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, February 2006), 3.

<sup>7</sup> Michael D. Double, "I am the Guard, A History of the National Guard, 1636-2000," (Washington, DC., U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001). 370

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., 3

<sup>9</sup> "Collectively, the entire Army is sometimes referred to as the "Total Army" to avoid confusion stemming from the common practice of referring to only the active component as "the Army." Congressional Budget Office, "Options for Restructuring the Army," (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 2005), 3.

<sup>10</sup> Mark A. Stoler, "George C. Marshall, Soldier-Soldier of the American Century," (Twayne's Twentieth-Century American Biography Series, No. 10), (Simon and Schuster Macmillan), 21-26.

<sup>11</sup> Frank N. Schubert and Theresa L. Kraus, "The Whirlwind War," (Department of the Army), (Center for Military History Publication 70-30), 71

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> "Since its adoption in 1973, the Total Force Policy has guided decisions about how people available to the Department of Defense—active, Reserve component (RC), retired military, federal civilian, Service auxiliaries, and contractors—are structured to protect the nation's interests. The integrated capabilities of the Total Force are essential to successfully implementing U.S. defense strategy and, indeed, are a prerequisite to a cost-effective force structure." U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to the President and Congress, Annual *Defense Report*, 1998, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998), Chapter 9.

<sup>14</sup> National Guard, State of the ARNG Since 9/11, Level of Activity Briefing, presented to Chief, National Guard Bureau, and LTG H. Steven Blum on 1 February 2006.

<sup>15</sup> General R. A. Cody, "Anton Myrer Army Leader Day," briefing slides, Carlisle Barracks, U.S. Army War College, 26 Oct 3005.

<sup>16</sup> Quadrennial Defense Review Report, (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, February 2006), 76-77.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 42

<sup>18</sup> Les Brownlee and Gen. Peter Schoomaker, USA, "Serving A Nation at War: A Campaign Quality Army with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities," *Parameters*, Summer 2004, pp. 5- 23.

<sup>19</sup> National Guard, State of the ARNG Since 9/11, Level of Activity Briefing, presented to Chief, National Guard Bureau, and LTG H. Steven Blum on 1 February 2006.

<sup>20</sup> The National Guard Bureau, "National Guard Homeland Defense White Paper: September 11, 2001, Hurricane Katrina, and Beyond," (Arlington, VA: National Guard Bureau, 2005), 11 October 2005. 12

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 4

<sup>22</sup> LTC H. Steven Blum, Chief National Guard Bureau, "2006 National Guard Posture Statement," (Arlington, VA: National Guard Bureau, 2005).

<sup>23</sup> Jay Smith, "A Changing of the Guard: The U.S. National Guard and Homeland Defense." BCSIA Discussion Paper 2003-04, ESDP Discussion Paper ESDP-2003-01, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, May 2003.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Jack Spencer and Larry M Wortzel, "Backgrounder," (Washington, D.C. The Heritage Foundation), April 2002, Volume No. 1532, 4

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> LTC H. Steven Blum, Chief National Guard Bureau, "2006 National Guard Posture Statement," (Arlington, VA: National Guard Bureau, 2005).

<sup>28</sup> LTC H. Steven Blum, Chief National Guard Bureau, "Army National Guard Vision 2010," (Arlington, VA: National Guard Bureau, 2005). 2

<sup>29</sup> The Posse Comitatus Act, Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 1385, reads in its entirety: "Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army (or the Air Force) as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the law shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years or both." This act is widely interpreted as a prohibition against the use of federal military forces in a domestic law enforcement role." There are opposing view points. John R. Brinkerhoff wrote in *The Journal of Homeland Defense* in February 2002 "The Posse Comitatus Act and Homeland Security," that the prevailing view is a complete misrepresentation of the original and true intent of the act.

<sup>30</sup> The White House, "Executive Summary of Findings," "The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned," (Washington, DC., Us Government Printing Office, February 2006). 4

<sup>31</sup> Senator Ben Nelson, "Cooperating To Guard the National Guard," *The Hill*, 1 March 2006.

<sup>32</sup> The National Guard Bureau, "National Guard Homeland Defense White Paper: September 11, 2001, Hurricane Katrina, and Beyond," (Arlington, VA: National Guard Bureau, 2005), 11 October 2005.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., 9

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., 10

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., 11